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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

Case No. 20060473-CA
:
20060474-ca

MILTON SMITH,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Defendant is appealing from a Judgment, Sentence and Commitment in the Second
District Court for Weber County, Utah, dated April 11, 2006. The Defendant pled guilty to
Distributing a Controlled Substance, a second degree felony, and Attempted Possession of a
Controlled Substance, a class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to serve a term of one to
fifteen years at the Utah State Prison and three hundred and sixty-five days. The sentences
were ordered to run consecutive. Jurisdiction for the Appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court
of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(j).

ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
DIDN'T HOLD THE STATE TO THE PLEA AGREEMENT
AND THEN SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT TO PRISON?

Standard of Review: The Court must determine whether the trial court abused
its discretion when it allowed the State to breach its agreement and then
sentenced the Defendant to prison.

"A sentence will not be overturned on

appeal unless the trial court has abused its discretion, failed to consider all
legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds legally prescribed
limits." Stale v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). This issue
was preserved when the Defendant's attorney objected to the State's failure to
remain silent. (R. 55/5, 8).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Section 78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court
review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except
the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School
and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of
Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive
director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged in District Court, case number 051905438,
with Distribution of a Controlled Substance, a first degree felony. (R. 001) This
offense occurred on September 12, 2005. (R. 001). On December 28, 2005,
2

Defendant pled guilty to Distribution of a Controlled Substance, a second degree
felony. (R. 52/3) As part of the plea agreement the State agreed to remain silent
at sentencing. (R. 52/3) Defendant was scheduled to be sentenced on February
8, 2006. However, prior to sentencing Defendant was charged with an unrelated
third degree felony for Possession of a Controlled Substance in District Court,
case number 061900536. (R. 001) This offense occurred on August 11, 2005,
which was prior to the date of offense on the distribution charge. (R. 001).
On February 22, 2006, Defendant pled guilty to a class A misdemeanor
attempted possession of a controlled substance. (R. 54/3-6). There were no
deals made concerning sentencing on the class A misdemeanor. (R. 54/3). The
Defendant was sentenced on April 5, 2006. At sentencing the prosecutor asked
for the second (the class A misdemeanor) case to run consecutive to the
distribution charge. During her argument she referenced both cases and the
Defendant's activities regarding both cases several times. (R. 55/7-8). The
Defendant was sentenced to serve one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison
and three hundred sixty-five days to run consecutive. (R. 36-37 case number
051905438, and R. 17-18 case # 061900536). The final order was signed on
both cases April 11, 2006. A notice of appeal was filed on May 11, 2006.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Defendant pled guilty to a second degree felony charge of
Distributing a Controlled Substance on December 28, 2005. (R. 52/3-6). The
Defendant allegedly sold cocaine to an undercover police officer. (R. 52/4). As
part of the plea bargain, the State agreed to remain silent at sentencing. (R.
52/3) After the Defendant pled guilty but before he was sentenced he was
charged with a third degree felony, Possession of a Controlled Substance that
occurred prior to the distribution charge. On February 22, 2006, Defendant pled
guilty to a reduced charge of Attempted Possession of a Controlled Substance, a
class A misdemeanor. (R. 54/3-6) There were no agreements made concerning
sentencing.

The Defendant was sentenced on April 5, 2006. During the

sentencing hearing the prosecutor made several references to both of
Defendant's cases. The trial judge sentenced the Defendant to one to fifteen
years and three hundred sixty-five days to the prison to be served consecutively.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Defendant entered into a plea agreement on a second degree felony
wherein the State agreed to remain silent at sentencing. The Defendant also pled
guilty to a separate unrelated case of Attempted Possession of a Controlled
Substance, a class A misdemeanor.

There were no agreements concerning

sentencing. Therefore, the State was allowed to speak concerning the class A

4

misdemeanor and at the most ask for one year in jail Instead, the State made
several references to both charges as well as to drug dealing and drug slinging.
The trial judge then sentenced the Defendant to prison and ordered the
misdemeanor to run consecutive to the prison sentence. The Defendant appeals,
requesting this Court to remand the matter back to the trial court to determine
the appropriate remedy for the State's breach.

ARGUMENT
In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), the Supreme Court
recognized that a defendant who enters into a plea bargain with the State has a
constitutional right to a remedy when that plea agreement is broken. Id. at 262.
The Court left the question of whether that remedy should be withdrawal of the
guilty plea or specific performance of the plea agreement to the state courts to
decide. Id. at 263.
In Utah, there is no bright line rule as to what the proper remedy is. See,
State v. Smit, 95 P.3d 1203 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). "hi dicta, the Utah Supreme
Court in State v. Garfield, 552 P.2d 129 (Utah 1976), seems to leave discretion
in the hands of the trial judge as to the appropriate remedy for breach of a plea
agreement." Id. at 1206.

5

In the case at bar, the State's attorney entered into an agreement with the
Defendant through his attorney.

The Defendant relied on the State's

representations that they would remain silent concerning his felony charge.
Instead, the State repeatedly breached the agreement by referring to the
distribution case and the circumstances surrounding it.
The State began by asking that the charges run consecutive to each other.
(R. 55/5). After defense counsel pointed out that the State had agreed to remain
silent, the prosecutor said, "I don't think we agreed to remain silent on either
one of them." (Id.) After she reviewed the plea affidavit, she acknowledged
that the State had agreed to remain silent on the felony but not the misdemeanor.
(R. 55/6-7) She stated, "If we did not agree to remain silent on the misdemeanor
then I'm going to speak to the misdemeanor case." (R. 55/7).
The prosecutor's next words were, "I think the problem in these two cases
and what would justify running theses two charges consecutively, is that both
of these incidents are happening . . . over on Adams Avenue."

(R.

55/7)(emphasis added). She went on to state that "that area is just full of
individuals who are dealing drugs, using drugs, and slinging drugs in that area. .
. . And what this defendant has apparently done on two different occasions, has
been part of the problem . . ." (Id. )(emphasis added). She later added "[t]his

6

isn't just about use this is about blighting a whole area of this city on a regular
basis." (Id. at 7-8)(emphasis added).
Defendant's attorney interjected. He stated, CT guess the real problem I
have is the State made an agreement to remain silent on sentencing on the more
serious charge, and the State just made in their recommendation references three
times to two cases, and I just think that violates the whole due process issue
here. And I just think the Court just needs not to take that into consideration."
(Id at 8.)
The trial judge didn't respond to defense counsel's objections.

The

prosecutor started speaking again and said, 4Tf defense counsel thinks we are to
remain silent on the felony but then the misdemeanor gets resolved second in the
scenario with a specific agreement that Mr. Daines is going to be recommending
consecutive, it doesn't bind us on that second case from addressing it. Anything
I'm saying has specifically to do with whether or not the misdemeanor ought to
run consecutive to the felony. I have made no comment in regard to the felony.
The problem is that what justifies the consecutive sentence, is because the
defendant has become involved in that particular felony case." (Id. at 8-9.)
There are a couple of obvious problems with the State's justification for
breaching the plea agreement. For starters, in the second case the State hadn't
made a "specific agreement" that it would be recommending a consecutive
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sentence. See, (R. 54/3-7.) The same prosecutor was present at both the entry
of the plea on the misdemeanor case and at sentencing. At no time was there a
reference that the State would be seeking consecutive sentences.

The only

reference to the plea agreement was made by Defendant's counsel who stated,
"[t]he State has agreed to amend the charge to an attempted possession of pills
without prescription, a Class A misdemeanor. The State agreed to reduce it to a
Class A and that's the extent of the negotiations." (R. 54/3).
Since the State was allowed to speak concerning sentencing the State was
allowed to reference a class A misdemeanor, Attempted Possession of a
Controlled Substance. Instead, the prosecutor referenced the two cases four
times. She also referenced drug dealing and "slinging drugs." She made the
specific statement that "[t]his isn't just about use, this is about blighting a whole
area of this city on a regular basis" (Id. at 7-8)(emphasis added). She was
clearly not referring to a simple possession charge that had been amended to a
class A misdemeanor. Notwithstanding defense counsel's best efforts to object,
he was ignored by the trial court and his objections were basically ignored.
In Stale v. Smit, this Court stated that, "[w]e conclude that when a plea
agreement is breached by the prosecutor, the proper remedy is either specific
performance of the plea agreement or withdrawal of the guilty plea both at the
discretion of the trial judge." Id. at 1207.
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This case should therefore be remanded to the trial court for a
determination of the appropriate remedy. "[I]f the prosecutor in the instant case
had breached the plea agreement, we would remand to the trial court for a
determination of the appropriate remedy." Id. at 1207.
If it is determined that specific performance is the appropriate remedy, the
Defendant would request that he be resentenced by a different judge. "We note
that if the trial court determines that specific performance of the plea agreement
is the proper remedy for the State's breach, the State's recommendation and
Defendant's resentencing should take place before a different judge/ 5 State v.
Hale, 2005 WL 1530526 (Utah App.), 2005 UT App 305, fn. 4.
CONCLUSION
The State breached its agreement to remain silent when the prosecutor
referred on multiple occasions to both of Defendant's charges as well as drug
dealing and drug slinging. Therefore, the Defendant respectfully requests this
Court to remand the matter to the trial court to determine the appropriate remedy
for the State's breach.
DATED this j ^ d a y of September 2006.

DEE W. SMITH
Attorney for Appellant
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I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to
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Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0180, postage prepaid this
day of September 2006.

DEE W. SMITH
Attorney at Law
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 051905438 FS ,~7r

MILTON SMITH,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

^Utj

ERNIE W JONES
April 5, 2006

PRESENT
Clerk:
vennaw
Prosecutor: BEATON, BRENDA J
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): STATE PDA, GARY BARR
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: April 14, 1950
Video
Tape Number:
J040506
Tape Count: 3:45
CHARGES
1. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S (amended) - 2nd Degree
Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/29/2005 Guilty
HEARING
This is the time set for sentencing. The defendant is present and
represented by Gary Barr, public defender. Brenda Beaton is
present representing the State of Utah. Attorney Barr addresses
the Court. The State agreed to remain silent at sentencing.
The Court proceeds with sentencing.

P^HP

1

Case No: 051905438
Date:
Apr 05, 2006
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO
PTST C./S a 2nd Degree Felony,, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen
years in the Utah State Prison.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The sentence in this case shall run consecutively with the sentence
imposed in case number 061900536. Credit for all time served is
granted.

Dated this

/ ( day of tAf/<S/

, _20_<
-

•

"

>

if^-

,-ERNIE W JONES
District Court Jud6e

Paap 2 (last)

Mi

:•'•

or

SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs .

Case No: 061900536 FS

MILTON SMITH,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

nr

$

1

ERNIE W JONES
April 5, 2 006

^(Jb

Clerk:
vennaw
Prosecutor: BEATON, BRENDA J
Defendant's Attorney (s) : STATE PDA, GARY BARR
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: April 14, 1950
Video
Tape Number:
J040506
Tape Count: 3:45
CHARGES
1. ATTEMPTED POSSESSION OF A CONT SUB. W/O CONTAINER
Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/22/2006 Guilty

(amended) -

HEARING
This is the time set for sentencing. The defendant is present and
represented by Gary Barr, public defender. Brenda Beaton is
present representing the State of Utah. Attorney Barr addresses
the Court. Attorney Beaton addresses the Court.
Sentencing proceeds.
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED POSSESSION OF A
CONT SUB. W/O CONTAINER a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is
sentenced to a term of 365 day(s)

Paae 1

Case No: 061900536
Date:
Apr 05, 2006
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The sentence in this case may be served at the Utah State Prison,
and shall run consecutively with the sentence imposed in case
number 051905438. The defendant is granted credit for time
previously served.
Dated this

;

( day of

- (Ave/ (

20 ^ C .

ERNIE W JONES
District Court JiAdge

Pace ? (laqf)
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Page 3

1

OGDEN, UTAH, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 5, 2006, 3:45 PM

2

P R O C E E D I N G S

3

THE COURT:

4

Smith, Case No. 5438 and 0536 on for sentencing.

5

Did you get a copy of the pre-sentence

6
7

reports on Mr. Smith?
I

MR. BARR:

8
9

The State of Utah versus Milton

THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.
Is there any legal reason we

shouldn't impose sentence?

10

MR. BARR: No, Your Honor.

11

THE COURT:

12

Is there anything you want to say

about the recommendation?

13

MR. BARR:

Well, he didn't get a good

14

recommendation and I know he doesn't have a very good

15

history.

16

back in California in the early '90s he was on parole

17

for something and I'm trying to go back and I'm trying

18

to figure out what the charge was that he was on parole

19

for.

20

of the t h i n g s that are on t h e r e s o u n d like

21

type offenses and, granted, he's had a lot of them. I

22

guess maybe it was an armed robbery back in 1972, that's

23

obviously it, and maybe he had-- I don't know.

24

it's a life sentence out there, I don't know.

25

he had, you know, he had various violations after that

But if we kind of look at it, it looks like

A n d it's k i n d of h a r d to f i g u r e out b e c a u s e

most

misdemeanor

Maybe
But then

F>age 4

but most of them look likei mis,demeanors.

And then he

has had, since he has been here in Utah he has had- since 1996 he has had two Class B misdemeanors and now
the drug issues.

And he admit.s to me that he has a drug

problem <and he's •probably had a drug problem for a long
time and he would like to get help

And he is just

ask:Lng i f the Court would consider something o ther than
sending him to prison.
treatment program.

He would like to be in a drug

He tells me his fiance is here in

Court, they plan to be married on May the 9th, and he
would like to be able to have a life with her.
has a three-year old son.

And he

But he admits he has a drug

problem and he is just asking if the Court would give
him a zero tolerance type of a probation with a
treatment program.
THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Smith, anything

you wanted to say?
THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, Your Honor. I know I

have a problem. State prison would probably do me good.
But what I really need is some help, you know, with my
drug problems.

I know I have been here since October.

I assume, you know, I'm not going to come here-- I've
had chance after chance, but all I'm asking, is for one
chance, Your Honor, you know, to prove to you I can get
off of this with a little help. That's all I want, Your

Page

1

Honor, is just one chance.

2
3

THE COURT:

MS. BEATON:

MR. BARR:

10

MS. BEATON:
about sentencing.
charge.

11
12

15
16

He has pleaded to a more serious

This should be consecutive to that.

that he said that but he did say but-MS. BEATON: That's what I'm talking about.
I And he--

I don't have a note-THE COURT: He probably agreed to remain

I silent on the Class A.

17

MS. BEATON:

18

MR. BARR:

19

MS. BEATON:

20
21

Mine clearly says with no dea]

MR. BARR: And that might be on the Class A

13
14

Your Honor, I have a note in my

I file that says the State would agree to remain silent.

8
9

Mr. Daines thinks that Case No.

53 6 ought to run consecutive.

6
7

I don't think we have.
My notes-I don't think we agreed to

remain silent on either one of them.
MR. BARR:

Do you have a copy?

22

at the plea agreement.

23

MS. BEATON:

24
25

Does the State want

to be heard?

4
5

All right.

Okay. It does say that on the

(inaudible).
MR. BARR:

Can we look

On the misdemeanor?

Page 6

1

MS. BEATON:

2

MR. BARR:

(Inaudible).
On the Class A case, I didn't

3

negotiate that one, so I don't know what the deal was

4

between Mr. Allen and Mr. Daines.

5

THE COURT: On the 2nd, do you want to see it?

6

It says State to remain silent at sentencing.

7

I

MS. BEATON: But the Class A doesn't say that.

8

I

THE COURT:

9

was it

the same day?

10

MS. BEATON:

il

MR. BARR:

12

MS. BEATON:

13

MR. BARR:

14

THE COURT:

15

The Class A doesn't say?

No, there's n o That was a subsequent date.
(inaudible) different time.
That was a subsequent date.
So maybe you agreed to remain

silent on the--

16

MS. BEATON:

17

THE COURT: --felony and not on the Class A;

18

The felony.

is that--

19

MS. BEATON: That's all it says.

20

THE COURT:

21

Yeah, you're welcome to look at

the file if you would like, but I don't--

22

MR. BARR:

And for whatever reason that Class

23

A, does appear to have occurred before the more serious

24

offense.

25

MS. BEATON:

Well, I'm just telling you what

Page 7

Mr. Daines is saying is that if we did not agree to
remain silent on the misdemeanor then I'm going to speak
to the misdemeanor case.
THE COURT:

It looks to me like he agreed to

remain silent on the felony but there isn't anything in
the file on the Class A so-MS. BEATON:

I think the problem in these two

cases and what would justify running these two charges
consecutively, is that both of these incidents are
happening, I don't know if the Court picked this up, but
they both happened over on Adams Avenue.

And the

problem, obviously, that this community is having is
that area is just full of individuals who are dealing
drugs, using drugs, and slinging drugs in that area. So
the officers have really been hassled, the Strike Force
and the officers of the Police Department, in trying to
clean this neighborhood up.

And what this defendant has

apparently done on two different occasions, has been
part of the problem, not part of the solution in that
neighborhood.

And so when the officers keep making

arrests in this area for similar types of narcotic type
activity going on, obviously, the defendant is not
getting the picture as to what he needs to do in order
to get off the drugs or to start being involved in this
kind of activity.

This isn't just about use this is

Page 8

about blighting a whole area of this city on a regular
basis.

And the police officers are there are on a

routine basis making arrests.

And this is about this

defendant not taking need by being arrested the first
time and becoming involved in this type of activity the
second time.

We think the charges ought to run

consecutively.
THE COURT:

All right. Anything else?

MR. BARR:

Well, I guess the real problem I

have is the State made an agreement to remain silent on
sentencing on the more serious charge, and the State
just made in their recommendation references three times
to two cases, and I just think that violates the whole
due process issue here. And I just think the Court just
needs not to take that into consideration.
The other thing that they seem to forget is
the misdemeanor case happened before the more serious
one, so it's not like he did the more serious one and
then went out and did the misdemeanor.
MS. BEATON:

I think the problem is just from

a negotiation standpoint, if defense counsel thinks we
are to remain silent on the felony but then the
misdemeanor gets resolved second in the scenario with a
specific agreement that Mr. Daines is going to be
recommending consecutive, it doesn't bind us on that

Page 9

second case from addressing it.

Anything I'm saying has

specifically to do with whether or not the misdemeanor
ought to run consecutive to the felony. I have made no
comment in regard to the felony. The problem is that
what justifies the consecutive sentence, is because the
defendant has become involved in that particular felony
case.

But as far as the State is concerned, it PDA

doesn't look into the issue before they work out a deal,
we're not bound on the second case to keep our mouth
shut.
MR. BARR:

I also think the presumption in

the law when you're looking at consecutive versus
concurrent is with something that happens subsequently
and this didn't happen subsequently.
THE COURT:

All right. I guess the thing

that jumps out at me, Mr. Smith, I haven't seen a rap
sheet like this in a long time. It starts in 1968, it
has gone on for for 3 7 years.

According to the notes

here you've gone to prison in '75, '89, '93, '95, '96.
They put you on parole a couple of times and you ran
away, so I don't know how I could put you on probation
again with that kind of a track record.
THE DEFENDANT:

For ten years, Your Honor,

you know, since 1996 to 2006 I didn't do any drugs.
THE COURT:

That's true. But you're back at
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it again in a b ig way, out there selling drugs so-All right.

In the case ending in

5438, the

distribution, arranging to distribute a controlled
substance, a 2nd degree felony, the sentence is one to
1 15 years at the Utah State Prison.

On the 2006 case

ending in 0536, the attempted possession of a controlled
1 substance, the sentence is one year at the Utah State
Prison.

I '11 recommend those sentences run consecutive.

Commitment will be forthwilih.
for any time he has served
MR. BARR:

I will give him credit
Good luck to you.

Your Honor, he wants me to ask if

you would stay the execution of the sentence so he can
get marrie d.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

No.

To May 9th?
I'm not going to do that.

That's too far out. That's almost a month and a half.
That's six weeks.

All right.

THE DEFENDANT:

Good luck to you.

Okay.

Thank you, Your Honor,

[Proceedings concluded at 3:55 p.m.]

